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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
RENT CONTROL, FiDAL, STATE AND MUNICIPAL. By Bernard Friedlander and
Anthony Curreri. New York: Central Book Company, 1948. Pp. xxii,
944, index. $15.00.
Because the subject of rent control, in its overall aspect, must perforce
overwhelm the authors of any single volume attempting to cover both its resi-
dential and commercial phases, criticism of this work must not be construed
as failure to appreciate the value of this ambitious project.
To the legal profession, the law of residential rent control at the National,
State, and Municipal levels is a "dark continent." The field is enormous and
the overlapping of authority and jurisdiction creates many lanes to a "no
man's land" wherein not only the Bar, but the Bench as well, stumbles along
in an effort to orient itself. To the extent that this book has compiled the
applicable statutes and regulations and many interpretations of both, as well
as a generous number of forms, it has a source material value to the lawyer
which should not be minimized. The book is living evidence of the authors'
industry and knowledge of the subject. The format could not be better; the
treatment of the separate subjects within the field is good and there is a con-
tinuity and coherence of exposition which testify to the authors' meticulous
editing.
However, at the moment of writing this review, it appears likely that the
early enactment by the Congress of the pending Housing and Rent Act of 1949
will substantially reduce the value of the book to the legal profession. Its
value will then consist mainly as a historical compilation of statutes, regula-
tions and interpretations, only few of which will continue in effect. Many of
the new provisions expected to be included in the forthcoming Act are not,
and of course could not be, included in the present work. Unfortunately these
new provisions and some of those to be eliminated, far outweigh in importance
that which remains, all of which will render the book less valuable as a current
text. If events, such as the passage of drastically different legislation, reduce
the value of their enterprise, the fault lies not with the authors but with the
necessity for constant changes in regulatory control required by the abrupt
changes in the economic and social problems in this field. While the book does
justify its raison d'etre, it does not attain the dignity and value of John W.
Willis' more limited, but distinguished analysis of the Housing and Rent Act
of 1947.1
Perhaps the most general misunderstanding, among lawyers and laity, of
the various rent control laws is caused by the failure to apprehend the dif-
ference between the philosophy of rent control as it was established and ad-
ministered in New York for some nine years during the 1920's and that upon
which was based the current federal effort. Shortly after World War I the
State of New York undertook a program of rent control based upon the theory
of a fair or reasonable rent for residential accommodations. In contrast to
this fundamental idea, the rent control program established by the Congress
in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 had as its basis a "freeze date"
theory of rent control. In the New York program, no administrative ma-




chinery was set up. What was, in any given case, a fair and reasonable rent,
was to be determined by the local courts. Upon these problems many different
considerations made their impact. Matters which were deemed relevant by
the court to a determination of a fair rent, such as financial return to the
landlord, the hardship upon the tenant or his inability to pay the rent demanded,
and many other issues served to create confusion and prevented a smooth en-
forcement of the legislation. In each tenant-landlord relationship there lay
dormant a germ of potential legislation; each controversy between landlord
and tenant meant litigation, burdensome to the courts, as well as to the liti-
gants. There was no predetermined fair and reasonable rent, and disagree-
ment as to what was such a rent inevitably meant recourse to the courts.
The federal concept was hinged upon the selection of a date,--in New York
City it was March 1, 1943,-on which the Administrator held that the impact
of the war effort had not yet affected the normal bargaining relation between
landlords and tenants. Rents were then frozen as of that date, allowing "the
chips to fall where they may." Because of the application of this rigid rule,
resulting perforce, in the creation of some unavoidable but curable inequities
and hardships, the Rent Regulations issued by the Federal Administrator pur-
suant to the Act, provided relief against such inequities and hardships.
This fundamental difference in concept is important to all concerned with
the administration and effect of rent control, for without an understanding
thereof, the lawyer charts his course without a map and the landlord and tenant
blindly rail against the economic effect upon them. All too often the Bar
and the public complain about the unfair or unreasonable rent ceiling estab-
lished in a given case, not realizing that it was the product of a general plan
of control and not of a duty to fix a fair or reasonable rent. The book fails
to mention this and thus misses the opportunity to give its readers a proper
perspective.
Another striking difference between the New York State rent control laws
of the 1920's and those of the 1 ederal Government is to be observed in the
exclusive jurisdiction given by the former to the courts and in the closing of
the doors to all courts effected by the Emergency Price Control Act, which
denied to all Federal, State, and Territorial courts, jurisdiction over contro-
versies stemming from the Act, until all administrative remedies had been ex-
hausted by way of review and protest to the Administrator from lower echelons
of authority. Then, and only then, could a landlord, and only a landlord,2 gain
admittance to the Emergency Court of Appeals, a special court created under the
constitutional authority of Congress to create inferior courts. Determinations
of this court were made reviewable only by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
This state of affairs continued until June 30, 1947, when the 80th Congress al-
lowed the Emergency Price Control Act to expire and enacted in its place, the
present Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended. That Act emasculated the
rent control program by omitting all provisions for criminal sanctions, treble
damage causes of action in favor of the Expediter, jurisdiction over evictions,
and control over hotels. In addition, the Emergency Court of Appeals was de-
prived of jurisdiction over all controversies except those which survived the de-
2 But see Parker v. Fleming, 329 U. S. 531, 91 L. ed. 479 (1947).
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mise of the Emergency Price Control Act; but access to the general courts was
no longer denied. It is probable that the 81st Congress will reinstate all of these
provisions, now contained in the pending bill, to the end that a revivified fed-
eral rent control law will continue to be available to the government for the
protection of the millions of tenants whose best hope for security of tenure
in their homes and safety from exactions of excessive rents rests upon a strong
law vigorously enforced. With the resurrection of the foregoing sanctions,
it is likely that the temporary need for supplemental legislation such as the
New York City local rent laws will no longer exist and they will be allowed
to lapse. However, this does not apply to the so-called "stand-by" rent con-
trol law which the New York State legislature has enacted and kept alive
against the possibility of the removal of all federal controls over housing
accommodations. It is to be hoped that New York will continue this passive
stand-by legislation until the need therefor is finally gone. No one would like
to see a recurrence of the hiatus which for twenty-five days in July 1946
caused such havoc and created such chaos throughout the country in cities
which lacked the protection afforded by the New York stand-by law.
This reviewer can only hope that the nation will soon find it unnecessary
to continue any regulatory control over rents. While justified as a stop gap
against inflationary trends and a protection against the emergency, the economy
of the country ,and the social health of its people are much better off without
this control in particular, and most economic controls in general.
IRA A. SCHILEiR.*
Ta ROOSEVELT CoURT. By C. Herman Pritchett.' New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1948. Pp. xvi, 314. $5.00.
Twelve years ago the iconoclasts took great delight in citing Chief Justice
Hughes' aphorism that the Constitution is what the justices of the Supreme
Court say it is. It has never been clear to me just why that perfectly obvious
dictum was seized upon as ammunition by the reformers, or why they should
have derived immense satisfaction in pointing out that the judges of the Court
are human. These two propositions are, to put it mildly, patent to anyone who
has read even one basic history of the United States.
Professor Pritchett's book, to which he has given the subtitle A Study in
Judicial Politics and Values, is not addressed to either of these two proposi-
tions, although at times it skirts them at uncomfortable length. This, how-
ever, is but a minor objection to an otherwise satisfactory and provocative
work. It is Professor Pritchett's thesis that the Supreme Court is a political
institution acting in a political context, and it is his further thesis that this
institution can profitably be studied through an analysis of its nonunanimous
opinions. It is in the nonunanimous opinion that Professor Pritchett finds
the expression and synthesis of what he calls "the judicial attitude." "A unani-
* Chief Attorney, United States Office of Housing Expediter, New York
County Defense Rental Area.
1 Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Chicago.
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